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CRIMINAL PROCEDUREPROBATION REVOCATION

A Probationary Revocation Hearing is not
a Criminal Prosecution -Williams v. State, 409 So. 2d
1331 (Miss. 1982).
James Allen Williams, a probationer, filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus on December 4, 1980, alleging that his constitutional right to a public trial had been denied him when the judge
presiding over his probationary revocation hearing had barred the
public from the courtroom.'
Williams, who had been placed on probation for three years
after pleading guilty in March, 1980, to a charge of selling marijuana, was once again arrested on the same charge on July 22,
1980.2 During the probationary revocation hearing the circuit judge
of Yazoo County barred the public, including Williams' relatives,
from the courtroom in order to protect the identity of the principal witness, an undercover policeman. Thereafter, on December
4, 1980, Williams filed a writ of habeas corpus in which he charged
a violation of his rights under the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution and under article III, section 26 of the
Mississippi Constitution.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's
opinion, stating that Williams' constitutional rights had not been
violated because a probationary revocation hearing' is not a
criminal prosecution, and the same rights afforded a criminal under
either the Mississippi or the United States Constitutions were not
due him.'
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-

DISCUSSION

At the outset of its opinion the court refused to categorize a
probationary revocation hearing as a criminal prosecution;
therefore, a probationer was viewed as a person who had been
vested with a privilege by the court, and thereby the full range
of rights under the Constitution did not extend to him. The court
drew a distinction between a criminal proceeding and a probationary revocation hearing, the hearing being described as "an ad1. Williams v. State, 409 So. 2d 1331 (Miss. 1982).
2. Id.at 1331.
3. Id.
4. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963). When comparing parole and probation, Judge Burger stated: "While there are distinguishing factors between probation and parole,
the underlying purposes are closely allied... . Congress, which is the source of both of these
penological devices, had given no indication that the revocation of parole should be more
difficult or procedurally different [from] revocation of probation." Id. at 236. Therefore, within
case authority parole revocation hearings have been applied to probationary revocation hearings
and vice versa.
5. 409 So. 2d at 1333 (Miss. 1982).
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ministrative summary proceeding growing out of a privilege that
was granted appellant by the lower court when the suspended
sentence and probation were granted."6
The court decided that minimum due process requirements had
been afforded Williams during his hearing and refused to go outside the scope of these rules. The court avoided any discussion
on the importance of a public hearing in regard to a probationer's
basic individual rights as several courts had done in regard to addressing the importance of having counsel present at a probationary
revocation hearing. 7 The court strongly relied on the proposition
that a probationer does not receive the "full panoply" of rights
which are due a defendant in a criminal prosecution under the
requirements of the Constitution.s
LAW

The theory that a parole or probation revocation hearing is not
a criminal proceeding is a majority view, 9 and therefore, most
courts have held that probationers should not be afforded the same
constitutional safeguards as those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution to defendants in criminal cases. In probationary
revocation hearing cases the courts have held that the sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution governs only "criminal prosecutions."10 The basic distinction between the constitutional rights of
a free person and those of a probationer have been explained by
describing the probationer's freedom as conditional, or by stating
it another way: "A person is provisionally free who would otherwise be in jail."11 The different judicial treatment of a "conditional6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (provided counsel to probationers
on a case by case basis); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (when sentencing is imposed
during a probationary revocation hearing, counsel should be provided since personal liberties
are at stake); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969) (counsel should be
provided in probationary revocation hearings because personal rights are threatened).
8. 409 So. 2d at 1332 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
9. See, e.g.,Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972); In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Hollien, 105 F.
Supp. 987 (W.D. Mich. 1952); Rasmussen v. State, 18 Md. 443, 306 A.2d 577 (1973); Gardner
v. Collier, 274 So. 2d 662 (Miss. 1973).
10. 318 F.2d at 237. In the Hollien case probationer sought a "speedy trial." The court had
refused to serve notice on the probationer for a violation of probation involving a suspended
sentence. While serving a prison term for a second conviction, the probationer, upon learning
of the probation violation warrant, requested that the court go ahead and serve it on him so
that he might serve two concurrent prison terms. The court refused to grant him a speedy
hearing on the probationary revocation warrant, stating that his rights had not been violated
because a probationary revocation hearing was not a criminal proceeding; therefore, the rights
due a criminal, one of which is a speedy trial, were not due a probationer. See also Riggins
v. Rhay, 75 Wash. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969).
11. Comment, Post-Conviction Criminal Rights: Parole and Probation Revocation and Bail,
8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 682, 684 (1974-75).
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ly" free person and an "unconditionally" free person, therefore,
has been made manifest in the probationary revocation hearing
process.
In an attempt to categorize the probationary revocation hearing as something other than a criminal proceeding, the hearing
has been seen as more "in the nature of a summary prosecution
proceeding" rather than "a 'criminal prosecution' entitling defendant to a 'speedy and public trial' under the sixth amendment of
the Constitution."12

Even though the weight of authority favors the view that the
rights afforded a probationer during a probationary revocation
hearing do not rise to the level of rights afforded a defendant in
a criminal prosecution, the courts have not ignored the rights of
the probationer because "the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind ... is a principle basic

to our society. " "
The courts' views have evolved and expanded over the years
as such rights have been demanded by probationers and parolees.
That development will be shown in the following paragraphs.
Justice Cardozo in Escoe v. Zerbst " ruled that by statute Congress had mandated that the probationer, upon violation of probation, should have a hearing in which he could answer charges
against him. In Escoe, instead of being "forthwith... taken before
the court which had imposed the sentence," the probationer was
"taken to a prison beyond the territorial limits of that court and
kept there in confinement without the opportunity for a hearing. " "
Cardozo further stated that when the court denied the probationer
the right to answer charges it had failed in its duty to follow congressional mandate."

In its Mempa v. Rhay 7 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that
in particular probationary revocation hearings counsel is required.
When sentencing is delayed, then imposed during a probationary
revocation hearing, as was the case in Mempa, the probationer
should have counsel present. In Mempa Justice Thurgood Marshall reviewed the rights provided criminals by the sixth, as applied through the fourteenth, amendment to the Constitutibn.
Marshall then applied the same rights to the probationer in Mem12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

United States v. Hollien, 105 F. Supp. at 988 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
295 U.S. 490 (1935).
Id. at 492.
Id. at 493-94.
389 U.S. 128 (1967).
Id. at 134.
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pa. " Marshall based his decision on the fact that in particular situations where the probationer's delayed sentence is based on actions
for which he will never be tried, i.e., acts committed while on
probation, the probationer should be provided with counsel.19 Marshall saw sentencing during this type of probationary revocation
hearing as a continuation of the criminal trial process because
substantial rights of a probationer would be affected." Some officials have read Mempa narrowly and refused counsel unless
substantial rights of the probationer or parolee have been affected. 2 ' When Mempa is read broadly, the courts have extended
the criminal's rights to every stage of the criminal process, even
to include probationary revocation hearings.2 2
When an Iowa parolee challenged revocation hearing procedures
in Morrissey v. Brewer,2 the Supreme Court interpreted the
statutory procedures as mandating a preliminary and public hearing. Before this ruling, parolees were at the mercy of varying
state laws which set forth their rights. To insure due process to
the probationer, certain minimum due process requirements were
24
set forth which have been widely adhered to since that time. After
setting forth those requirements the Court was quick to add:
We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a
criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible
and other material that would
enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits,
25
trial.
criminal
adversary
an
in
admissible
not be

The Court in Morrissey gave flexibility to a parolee's due process and called for "such procedural protections as the particular

19. Id. at 135.
20. Id. at 134.
21. See Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968) (Mempa was seen as inapplicable to parole revocation proceedings); Holder v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.
Tex. 1968); Riggins v. Rhay, 75 Wash. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969).
22. Ashworth v. United States, 391 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that Mempa established the right to counsel at federal probationary revocation hearings). See also State v.
Seymour, 98 N.J. Super. 526, 237 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968). See generally
Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel-State Courts Split on Probationers' Right to
Counsel at Revocation Hearing, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955 (1967).

23. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
24. The minimum due process requirements set forth in Morrissey are:
(a) Written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence
against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached'
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f)a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied
on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489.
25. Id.
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situation demands."26 Morrissey further stated that a state agency, in considering what due process procedures are appropriate
for a parolee, should look to the circumstances, the function of
the agency, and the interests of the parolee that are at stake.27
While many courts have followed Morrissey's standards, there
are still rights which parolees and probationers demand which are
out of the scope of these rules. Many courts have refused to hold
that the sixth amendment guarantees counsel to all probationers
during revocation hearings. 8 Constitutional guarantees have been
withheld because in a probationary revocation hearing the criminal
is at "an entirely different stage of the criminal-correctional
process." 9 The courts have, however, viewed each situation and
made decisions based on the particular circumstances.
One of these much litigated rights is a probationer's right to
counsel during a probationary revocation hearing. In Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,3° the Court reversed the court of appeals' acceptance
of the probationer's contention that the "State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents in all probation or
parole revocation cases."'" In Gagnon the Court surmised that in
most probationary revocation hearings the presence of counsel
would be unnecessary, but it was cautious in considering that "there
will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness-the
touchstone of due process -will require that the State provide at
its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees."32
ANALYSIS

The decision of the court in the instant case turned on its reading
of the Mississippi and U.S. Constitutions in regard to their applicability to a probationary revocation hearing. The Mississippi
Supreme Court relied on its previous decision in Gardnerv. Collier." Gardner had followed Morrissey and held that a revocation hearing was not a criminal prosecution."
The Court in Morrisseyhad posed two questions which the court
in the instant case considered: (a) Is a probationary revocation
hearing a criminal prosecution? and (b) If a revocation hearing
is not protected by the Constitution, what due process should be
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 481.
Id.
Riggins v. Rhay, 75 Wash. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969).
In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337, 338 (1st Cir. 1970).
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Id. at 787.
Id. at 790.
274 So. 2d 662 (1973).
Id.
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afforded the probationer?" Seeking the answers the Mississippi
Supreme Court looked to Gagnon"' which had also relied on
Morrissey. 7 The Court in Gagnon recognized that even though
the withdrawal of personal liberty is involved in a probationary
revocation hearing, such a hearing is not a criminal prosecution,
and a probationer is entitled to a preliminary and final hearing. 8
After analyzing Williams' revocation hearing the court found
that the minimum requirements set out in Morrissey9 had been
adhered to. Williams had been afforded adequate counsel, and
when an objection was properly made concerning the closed
hearing, the court had overruled it."0
Upon a determination that Williams had been treated fairly in
the hearing, the court addressed the issue of a probationer's standing in regard to his constitutional rights. The court indicated that
because of the standing of a probationer under the Constitution
he was not due a "speedy and public trial. "41 To substantiate its
assertion that Williams was not due a public hearing, the court,
by inference, relied on United States v. Hollien"2 in which the
probationer claimed that he had been denied constitutional rights
to a "speedy trial.""3 The court in Hollien ruled that the probationer was not due the same rights as a criminal defendant because
a probationary revocation hearing is not a "criminal prosecution"
but is more in the nature of a "summary proceeding.""
CONCLUSION

There were no cases directly on point: a probationer's rights
to a "public hearing" during a probationary revocation hearing.
Therefore, the court relied on cases which dealt with Morrissey's
minimum due process requirements, as well as those which dealt
with rights which were out of the scope of Morrissey.
The court determined that Williams' probationary revocation
hearing had been properly administered and that any due process
rights due him arose out of his standing under the privilege granted
him by the lower court in suspending his sentence. The source
of his due process rights was not constitutional.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 477, 484 (1972).
409 So. 2d at 1332.
Id.
411 U.S. at 781-82.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
409 So. 2d at 1332.
Id. at 1333 (quoting United States v. Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987, 988 (W.D. Mich. 1952)).
105 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
Id. at 988.

Id.
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The court summed up its decision by looking to Morrissey once
more. It stated, "[T]he full panoply of rights due a defendant in
a criminal prosecution under the requirements of the Constitutions does not apply to suspension and parole revocations. 45
In reaching its decision as to Williams' right to a public trial
the court refused to categorize a probationary revocation hearing
as a criminal prosecution. The court further refused to call a probationer's liberty a right, but rather called it a privilege which
is conditional in scope.
In United States v. Hollien, 6 in which a probationer was denied
a "speedy trial," the Mississippi court found its closest precedent
in regard to the question of a "public trial." The court never discussed the implications of a closed hearing in a probationary
revocation hearing; rather it assumed the circuit judge, who had
ordered the closed hearing, had exercised discretion. The court
denied Williams the writ of habeas corpus because it saw no basis
for a constitutional right to a public revocation hearing.
The court addressed the general constitutional rights of a probationer during a probationary hearing, yet it was reluctant to
analyze and discuss the specific constitutional right to a public
hearing. Several courts mentioned herein 7 addressed the issue of
providing counsel for probationers and parolees during revocation hearings. If the courts have found merit in discussing the probationer's right to counsel during a revocation hearing, future
courts will similarly find themselves faced with discussing the
merits of a probationer's constitutional right to a "speedy and public
trial."
Gail Swan Akin

45. 409 So. 2d at 1333.
46. 105 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
47. See supra note 7.

